INTRODUCTION
Nearly one year after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,' lower courts have had a number of opportunities to apply it in challenges to a myriad of federal and state gun control laws. In earlier articles, we predicted that the true test of Heller's robustness would be in its reception by the lower courts.! The cool reception to prior "landmark" Court decisions, however, left us skeptical of how large an impact a single Supreme Court decision might make? After reviewing lower court interpretations of Heller, our skepticism appears to have been warranted: courts have not rushed to overturn the federal gun laws that, hypothetically, were vulnerable following the Court's decision that the Second Amendment guaranteed an individual right to private gun ownership. Most courts, dutifully following dicta in Heller itself, have concluded that regulations short of absolute bans or that ban ownership for discrete classes of persons pass muster.
But it would be a mistake to conclude that Heller changed nothing. While no federal gun control laws are in serious danger, numerous state and local laws are-like the District of Columbia's-more draconian. As those cases wend their way through the lower courts, those state and local governments find themselves legislating in Heller's shadow; some have even preemptively repealed their bans, replacing them with something less stringent State courts, moreover, are issuing opinions on the merits of Second Amendment challenges to state and local gun laws in advance of a Supreme Court decision formally incorporating the Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment.' This suggests to us that judges are internalizing the fundamental-or at least the individual-nature of the right to keep and bear arms.
And though the federal courts are not striking down federal laws directly, they too are adjudicating in the shadow of Heller. Now that the right to keep and bear arms is a recognized individual right, due process protections attach, with implications for at least one existing statute. 6 In addition, some evidence exists that courts will employ the canon of avoidance in construing gun laws, interpreting statutes so as to avoid conflicts with the Second Amendment. 7 We describe these developments, and use this preliminary data, to refine our earlier predictions about the likely significance of Heller for constitutional law.
In Part I, we briefly review the predictions we hazarded about Heller's likely reception in the lower courts. In Part II, we describe how, in Heller's first year, federal and state courts have nearly unanimously rejected constitutional challenges to various gun control regulationsespecially regulations that fall within the categories Justice Scalia flagged as presumptively constitutional in the majority opinion-often with little or minimal analysis. That is the bad news. In Part III, however, we note that there is evidence that Heller's unequivocal declaration that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right is having some impact, not only in the courts, but, perhaps more importantly, on nonjudicial actors. Following Heller, gun control policies-even at the state and local level-will be made in the shadow of the Second Amendment. A brief conclusion follows.
I. HELLER AND THE LOWER COURTS: EARLY PREDICTIONS
In our earlier article, we wondered whether Heller would suffer the same fate as Lopez 8 and Morrison, 9 or whether it would end up being enforced more robustly by lower court judges." 0 We identified a number of factors that made us skeptical: (i) "the institutional prejudices of" lower courts, whose judges want to clear their dockets of troublesome cases and not encourage their proliferation;" (2) the fact that Heller itself seemed to signal that lower courts should not go hog-wild with Heller;' 2 (3) ambiguity regarding the standard of review that made it difficult to police lower court evasion;' 3 and (4) the inapplicability of Heller to state and local gun control regimes, since even after Heller the Amendment remained unincorporated. 4 On the other hand, we suggested that public engagement with the issue and the ability of well-funded interest groups to bring good cases might increase the costs to federal judges of footdragging or evasion.' As we argue in the remainder of this Article, the early evidence is mixed. While few laws have actually been struck down or even called into question, courts do seem to understand Heller as a break with the past-how decisive a break, though, is not yet clear.
II. LOWER COURTS AND THE HELLER SAFE HARBOR
Justice Scalia's opinion seemed to anticipate-and seemed inclined to head off-a number of challenges to federal gun control laws that might have looked vulnerable in light of Heller. He wrote:
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. For good measure, he added that his list of "presumptively lawful regulatory measures.., does not purport to be exhaustive."' 7 Later in the opinion, he seemed to add weapons deemed dangerous or highly unusual to this list.' 8 As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, the basis for excluding ., that the sorts of weapons protected were those 'in common use at the time. ' We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the these classes of laws was not clear. 9 As we discuss in this Part, lower court judges have employed Justice Scalia's categorical exclusionswhich we refer to collectively as the "Heller safe harbor"-with gusto, expanding them in some cases.
A. LONGSTANDING PROHIBITIONS ON POSSESSION BY FELONS AND THE

MENTALLY ILL
A long list of persons prohibited from possessing firearms is found at I8 U.S.C. § 922(g)." By far, the most common challenges following Heller are those brought by felons convicted of violating § 922(g)(I), which prohibits the possession of firearms by convicted felons.' The typical defendant is, as one court colorfully put it, "one of many charged or convicted persons who believe that the United States Supreme Court's decision in [Heller] means that no one in possession of a firearm can be convicted of a crime, whatever the kind of gun and whatever the status of the person possessing it. is not ineffective assistance of counsel to refuse to raise a constitutional challenge to the felon-in-possession statute. 27 State courts, too, are rejecting similar challenges to bars on felons possessing firearms, 8 with one state court of appeals opining that such a ban would even survive strict scrutiny. 29 Courts have also rejected challenges, often without much analysis, from other disqualified persons by analogy to felons and the mentally ill. For example, the Lautenberg Amendment, passed in 1996, bars persons convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor from possessing firearms. 3 " A separate provision prohibits those subject to a domestic order of protection from possessing firearms as long as the order is in effect." Neither provision was specifically mentioned by the Heller Court, and neither is much of a "longstanding" prohibition. Nevertheless, no court has had much trouble rejecting challenges to those provisions. 3 2 To be fair, several of the court decisions are not as dismissive as those involving the ban on possession by felons. Courts mention, for example, that the ban is more narrowly drawn, focusing as it does on those who have committed a violent crime, as opposed to the felon-in-possession ban, which makes no such distinction. 3 As a Maine district judge noted, "[i]f anything, as a predictor of firearm misuse, the definitional net cast by § 922(g)(9) is tighter than the net cast by § 922(g)(i)." ' Those courts that bothered with applying any standard of review took it for granted that reducing domestic violence would qualify as a compelling governmental interest, and felt that barring possession was narrowly tailored to that interest. 35 And one may add drug dealers to the list of individuals whose Second Amendment challenges to various federal laws have been uniformly rejected by the courts. There are a number of statutes that penalize mixing guns and drugs.
37 Those who unlawfully use or are addicted to controlled substances, for example, are barred from possessing firearms."' In other cases, penalties for drug trafficking are enhanced if a gun is used in connection with those crimes. 39 One court termed the ban on possession by illegal drug users as another example of a longstanding prohibition on firearm possession that Heller permits, adding that "[n]othing in Heller restricts the federal government from criminalizing the possession of firearms by unlawful users of controlled holding that ban was narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest; noting that ban was temporary). [Vol. 6o:1245 substances. '4 ' Another judge distinguished Heller, stating that the decision "does not deal with statutes prohibiting possession or use of firearms in connection with criminal behavior."'" Other courts upheld the enhanced penalties for firearm use in the course of drug crimes by simply expanding the "well-rooted, public-safety-based exceptions to the Second Amendment right that appear consistent with Congress' determination that those unlawfully using or addicted to controlled substances should not have firearms at the ready.
See supra
2 B. LAWS FORBIDDING THE CARRYING OF FIREARMS IN SENSITIVE PLACES
Justice Scalia mentioned schools and government buildings specifically as part of the Heller safe harbor. 43 Not surprisingly, then, challenges to the Gun Free School Zones Act ("GFSZA") 4 (denying defendant's motion to dismiss and rejecting a challenge to r8 U.S.C. § 924(a)(i)(A), which penalizes false statements made in connection with firearms purchase, as applied to an illegal marijuana user). The Chafin court also distinguished Heller on the ground that "the Supreme Court addressed only the constitutionality of a sweeping District of Columbia firearm regulation-one that included a total ban on handguns-that was far more restrictive than the statutes allegedly violated." 6 In the case of the Post Office regulations, the court noted that the restrictions were-again in contrast with the District of Columbia's gun ban at issue in Heller-narrowly drawn to foster workplace safety, which was again assumed to be of great governmental importance. 47 And though they were not mentioned specifically in Heller, one New York court added airports to the "sensitive places" list. 4 " While one could readily agree with that addition, the conclusion of a California court that a private drive was a "sensitive place," thus bringing a conviction for carrying a concealed weapon under the Heller safe harbor, 49 seems a stretch.
C. LAWS IMPOSING CONDITIONS ON THE SALE OF ARMS
Federal law imposes numerous restrictions on the sale of arms," including a federal firearms licensing regime 5 ' and import restrictions on certain weapons. 2 Recently, the government has attempted to interdict so-called "straw purchases," where disqualified persons use a cut-out to make an otherwise lawful purchase on their behalf. 3 Federal law also prohibits the purchase of stolen weapons, 54 and "untraceable" weapons, like those with obliterated serial numbers. 5 The handful of challenges 46. Lewis, 2008 WL 5412013, at *3. As Eugene Volokh points out in his article, however, the gun in Lewis, though within a school "zone," was not possessed by the defendant on school grounds; it was apparently in his car, which was within the requisite number of feet from the school. 57 As the court pointed out in United States v. Marzzarella, though, the ban on possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers is much narrower than the law in Heller."' In addition, the court found that "[t]he Defendant's possession of a firearm in connection with its private sale to another is inherently inconsistent with an intention to possess the firearm for defense of the Defendant's home, since the Defendant cannot protect himself with a weapon that he sells away." 59 The court added that "untraceable firearms are of no particular use to the ordinary lawabiding citizen who intends to possess the firearm for common lawful purposes (such as defense of hearth and home). Rather, such weapons hold special value only for those individuals who intend to use them for unlawful activity."6'
The Marzzarella court took some pains to parse Heller, and rejected the defendant's argument that strict scrutiny applied, stating that the categorical exclusions like those in the Heller safe harbor were inconsistent with strict scrutiny, 6 ' and that the restrictions -like the ban at issue -functioned more like content-neutral "time, place, and manner" restrictions on speech. 6 2 Whatever the validity of the analogy, the judge did not simply dismiss the defendant's challenge out of hand.
Likewise, a Texas district court, rejecting a challenge to the ban on straw purchases, adopted intermediate scrutiny, It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service-M-16 rifles and the like-may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment's ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty. It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modem-day bombers and tanks. But the fact that modem developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817. Justice Scalia seemed to be saying that the linkage between the "arms" and the reason for which arms were guaranteed-i.e., to enable the militia to serve as a military counterweight to government soldiers-need not stay constant over time; that the armed citizenry is not constitutionally guaranteed the means to be an effective military counterweight. At the time of the Framing, rifles and pistols were common (not "dangerous and unusual") and the common weaponry of militia members, as well as useful for self-defense. Id. But that does not guarantee that all arms in common use by modem military units are protected. Now that such arms are considered "dangerous and unusual," they are presumptively subject to regulation by the government, even if-vis-A-vis government soldiers-the counterweight thus becomes less effective. Clearly the stress of Heller is on individual, as opposed to collective, self-defense.
Two early decisions concerning machine guns involved defendants who wished to argue to the jury their belief that the Second Amendment guaranteed their right to own machine guns. 67 In one, United States v. Gilbert, the defendant was not allowed to testify as to his belief in the Second Amendment's scopei t The defendant complained that the judge both issued a jury instruction saying that the defendant did not possess that right and rejected the defendant's jury instruction that tracked the testimony he unsuccessfully sought to give in court. 69 The Ninth Circuit rejected his argument in a single sentence: "Under Heller, individuals still do not have the right to possess machineguns or shortbarreled rifles.., and convicted felons.., do not have the right to possess any firearms." 7 "
The defendant in United States v. Fincher fared no better in the Eighth Circuit.' Adding insult to injury, that panel really decided the case under pre-Heller case law that rejected the individual right theory of the Second Amendment." Specifically, the court held that, contrary to the defendant's argument, prior case law had not created an affirmative defense to the ban on machine gun possession where possession of the machine gun was reasonably related to the maintenance of a wellregulated militia. 73 Upholding his conviction, the court said that it had "taken into account [the Heller decision]," but noted (i) that the Supreme Court also held that "the right to possess firearms is not beyond the reach of all government regulation," and (2) the existence of the Heller safe harbor for categories of weapons. 74 It concluded: "Accordingly, under Heller, Fincher's possession of the guns is not protected by the Second Amendment. Machine guns are not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore fall within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use." ' 2009 ), in which it held that the U.S. Supreme Court's "selective incorporation" decisions support the incorporation of the Second Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment and its application to the states. Surveying Founding-era history, and that surrounding the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court concluded that the right to keep and bear arms is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'. . . The crucial role this deeply rooted right has played in our birth and history compels us to recognize that it is indeed fundamental, that it is necessary to the AngloAmerican conception of ordered liberty that we have inherited. Id. at 457. It nevertheless went on to uphold a county ordinance prohibiting the possession of firearms on county property, which prevented promoters from holding gun shows in Alameda County. Id. at 460 ("[Tihe Ordinance does not meaningfully impede the ability of individuals to defend themselves in their homes with usable firearms, the core of the right as Heller analyzed it.").
states." 3 Rejecting a challenge to a state ban on nunchakus, for example, the Second Circuit observed that Presser v. Illinois was good law until the Supreme Court itself said otherwise. 84 An Illinois district court went out of its way to emphasize that stare decisis alone dictated the dismissal of a suit challenging the gun control laws of a Chicago suburb: "This Court should not be misunderstood as either rejecting or endorsing the logic of plaintiffs' argument, it may well carry the day before a court that is unconstrained by the obligation to follow the unreversed precedent of a court that occupies a higher position in the judicial firmament." 8 5
While a few courts, acknowledging the lack of incorporation, have proceeded to analyze gun laws under Heller anyway, no court to date has indicated that, but for the lack of incorporation, many of these laws would be vulnerable. 86 In general, judges seem to share Judge Jack Id. at *6 ("While I disagreed with gun lobbyists opposing federal handgun legislation in 1976, no reasonable person would be convinced by the Article that I am today prejudiced against these specific plaintiffs with a bias so deep that it cannot be readily set aside to enable me to fairly judge the specific issues presented in this litigation."). On the one hand, the foregoing seems to confirm our pessimistic predictions about the effect of Heller.
ss As was true following Lopez,"' courts sometimes strain to distinguish the challenged law from the one invalidated in Heller, with courts frequently remarking that this or that challenged law sweeps much more narrowly than did the District of Columbia's ordinance. 0 Similarly, one often sees little analysis-a grudging acknowledgement of Heller as a new fact of life, quickly followed by the conclusion that the case did not really change anything.
9 ' And while lower courts sometimes lament the lack of clarity in Heller regarding, say, what the standard of review actually was, 92 few judges seem interested in figuring it out on their own.
And yet it seems that this is precisely what the Supreme Court wanted. Political scientists and law professors alike have written extensively on signaling and agenda-setting by the Supreme Court. ) (rejecting challenge to personal jurisdiction in nuisance suit against gun dealers alleged to facilitate illegal arms purchases that ended up in New York, and adding that "[t]o transmutate Heller into an inhibition on long standing ancient nuisance powers of the state to control nuisances, the power of the federal government to regulate firearms that flow through the stream of interstate commerce, and the power of the federal judiciary in diversity cases to enforce that state substantive law is almost inconceivable"). For a characteristically thoughtful analysis of Heller and its application to a number of gun-control laws in various contexts, including some addressed in this Part, see Volokh, supra note 46.
88. any and all federal gun laws. It seems to us that the lower courts have certainly heeded this signal.
If the Heller safe harbor was indeed intended as a signal to lower courts (and litigants, perhaps), then it tends to confirm an earlier observation we made about Heller: that it is another example of the Court's tendency to constitutionalize the national consensus on certain hot button issues and then enforce it against outliers. 94 Whether this is a role that the Court ought to be undertaking is a subject for another day, but the early returns from the lower courts ought at least to allay the fears of those who foresaw a blizzard of cases coming, each potentially undermining gun control laws at all levels of government. 95 The lack of lower court enforcement, though, might leave gun rights advocates feeling cheated. After all, when you win in the Supreme Court, that is supposed to mean something, right? Well, in the silver lining department, we were somewhat surprised to see so many courts acknowledge that the Second Amendment had not been incorporated, then proceed to apply Heller anyway. 6 Perhaps they would not have done so had they not felt confident the measure would survive scrutiny; on the other hand, it might simply reflect acceptance of the fact that incorporation is a matter of time and that perhaps it would not be the apocalypse if it occurred.
And there is more: In the next Part, we discuss some interesting developments, both in and out of the courts, that suggest that the new right to keep and bear arms may end up being more robust than the decisions discussed above might have you believe. The recognition of an individual right, we argue, has caused legislators and judges to render decisions in Heller's shadow, with some interesting results.
III. LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICATION IN THE SHADOW OF HELLER
While Heller-based frontal assaults on firearms convictions have not been particularly successful to date, this is not to say that Heller has not influenced courts and legislators. With the recognition of firearms possession as an enumerated constitutional right, courts are now discovering that they must take notice of that fact in a number of [Vol. 6o: 1245 settings, sometimes-though far from always-to the benefit of defendants.
In Heller, the Supreme Court recognized that possessing firearms, including handguns, in the home for purposes of self-defense is protected as part of the individual right to arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment -a right that all nine Justices recognized as belonging to individuals, rather than to the states.' This has two effects that matter: First, firearms possession now acquires the protections that go with a constitutional right, even one whose scope remains less than fully defined. Second, firearms possession is also normalized: post-Heller, it is impossible to characterize gun ownership as an activity that is somehow suspect, deviant, or marginal when it has been recognized as a constitutional right. Both of these effects have turned out to make a difference in cases already, and it seems likely that they will influence future cases as well.
A. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
Immediately following the Heller decision, suits were filed against a number of state and local governments whose gun laws were as strict, or nearly so, as the District of Columbia's. 9 Absent incorporation, the suits were clear losers, and yet, rather than defend them, some cities amended their gun control ordinances, replacing what had been near-total bans on handguns with licensing schemes.' In San Francisco, the city settled a lawsuit brought by the National Rifle Association and now permits residents of San Francisco housing projects to possess arms."° Tenant leases previously had provisions "prohibiting the possession of guns and ammunition ..... Given the stress state and local budgets currently face as a result of the economic downturn, more cities-and even some statesmight decide that discretion is the better part of valor, and amend restrictive gun laws, rather than risk expensive lawsuits that they might ultimately lose. No such hydraulic pressure to amend these laws, however, would have been possible without the Heller decision. 4 Since Heller, this requirement has been treated differently in at least some federal courts. In United States v. Kennedy, the defendant was arrested after his laptop, examined upon his reentry to the United States at Seattle's SeaTac airport, was found to contain child pornography."'° Ultimately charged with "transportation of child pornography," he was subjected to the automatic requirements of the Adam Walsh Act, including the requirement that he refrain from possessing a firearm.'°6 The district court found that without a particularized finding of danger on the part of the defendant, such a requirement violated the Excessive Bail Clause"' and made the following comment regarding Heller: To the extent, then, that the Second Amendment creates an individual right to possess a firearm unrelated to any military purpose, it also establishes a protectible liberty interest. And, although the Supreme Court has indicated that this privilege may be withdrawn from some groups of persons such as convicted felons, there is no basis for categorically depriving persons who are merely accused of certain crimes of the right to legal possession of a firearm. Accordingly, the Adam Walsh Amendments violate due process by requiring that, as a condition of release on bail, an accused person be required to surrender his Second Amendment right to possess a firearm without giving that person an opportunity to contest whether such a condition is reasonably necessary in his case to secure the safety of the community. Because the Amendments do not permit an individualized determination, they are unconstitutional on their face. The Government's application to impose as a condition of bail that Mr. Arzberger not possess a firearm is therefore denied."' These cases suggest that, as an enumerated right, the right to possess firearms is not something that can be withdrawn at legislative whim. Rather, it is sufficiently important to trigger individualized due process protections, and to be impaired only when there is an individualized risk of firearms crime. (One suspects that the nexus between child pornography possession and firearms crime is likely to be slight; certainly these two cases do not suggest otherwise.) As noted earlier, Heller has proven to be anything but a get-out-ofjail-free card for felons in possession of firearms. Nonetheless, even here some federal courts are finding that the characterization of the right to arms as an individual right affects their analysis, though, at this point, not always sufficiently to get the accused off the hook. Nonetheless, the discussion raises some interesting points.
In United States v. Kitsch, the defendant was in the anomalous position of being unaware that he was a convicted felon; he was (or at least claimed to be) under the impression that the conviction had been expunged and, in fact, it had not shown up on a background check."
2 In discussing defendant's motion to require the government to prove scienter with regard to his status as a felon, the district court held:
In Heller, the Court found for the first time that the Second Amendment "guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation." The Court acknowledged that longstanding limitations on the ownership and use of weapons, including Section 922(g)(I), were consistent with that guarantee. Nevertheless, because the Constitution directly guarantees the right, such limitations are subject to some level of increased scrutiny....
A statute that imposes criminal penalties for the exercise of an enumerated constitutional right despite defendant's reasonable belief in good faith that he has complied with the law must, at the very least, raise constitutional doubts. Post-Heller, the Government's desired construction of Section 922(g)(i) imposes just such a burden on defendants who, for whatever reason, reasonably believe that they are not felons within the statutory definition. Faced with a statute that raises this sort of doubt, it is "incumbent upon us to read the statute to eliminate those doubts so long as such a reading is not plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."
... Accordingly, we find that the word "knowingly" in i8 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), when applied to the offense in i8 U.S.C. 922(g)(I), modifies both the elements of possession of the firearm and the status as a convicted felon. We will therefore grant defendant's motion as to this issue and will instruct the jury that, in order to convict Kitsch, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew or was willfully blind to the fact that he had a prior felony conviction that had not been set aside or expunged." 3 Furthermore, in another felon-in-possession case, United States v. Skeens, the defendant, a felon, was found to be in constructive possession of a number of firearms nominally owned by his wife." 4 The court did, These cases hardly represent a sea change in the constitutional law of firearms possession. They do, however, indicate that lower courts are taking cognizance of the Heller decision in a way that did not happen with regard to such decisions as Lopez or Morrison. Though these are not cases on all fours with Heller, the emergence of firearms possession as an individual constitutional right has plainly entered into the courts' consciousness and reasoning process; decisions on other topics are being made in the shadow of Heller.
There is even some evidence that this is happening at the state level. In Cleveland v. Fulton, the defendant, who had been charged with and acquitted of various disorderly conduct offenses, sought return of his seized handgun." 9 The city, meanwhile, sought forfeiture on the ground that an unregistered handgun was "contraband ..... The Ohio Court of Appeals held that:
Fulton's handgun was not a legally banned handgun, nor was he prohibited from owning or possessing it. The United States Supreme 115. Id. at 759 n.3 (citation omitted).
116.
See id. at 758 (affirming the guideline calculation formulated under the sentencing guidelines). iI8. Id. at *2 (citation omitted). This court certainly understands and shares the trial court's concerns about dangerous guns in our society and the damage and violence they can cause. That does not entitle the city, however, to deprive a person of his private property without due process of law.
Fulton's unregistered handgun not being contraband per se, he was entitled to have his property returned to him upon dismissal of the charges. ' The Fulton case demonstrates an important consequence of Heller's individual right holding: the normalization of firearms possession. In the past sometimes treated as a deviant act, something not to be permitted without the indulgence of the sovereign,"' firearms possession is now something contemplated by the Constitution-something not deviant, but normal, with the burden shifting from those who would possess firearms to those who would deny their possession."
3 This burden-shift may turn out to be the most consequential result of Heller, at least in the day-to-day work of state and federal courts.
D. THE FUTURE
Though concrete discussion will await a later installment of our postHeller survey, it seems possible that the shadow cast may be long enough to affect interpretation of the right-to-arms provisions in state constitutions. Although state constitutional interpretation is nominallyand, in recent years, often actually-independent of federal constitutional interpretation, there is no question that the United States Supreme Court has a powerful influence over the thinking of state court judges." 4 Though in some cases state courts have interpreted their state right-to-arms provisions more strongly than the Supreme Court has interpreted the Second Amendment" 5 -just as, before Lawrence v. At this stage, it remains unclear how that will shake out. One interesting aspect of the Heller decision is that-unlike Lopez or Morrison-it addresses issues not strictly federal in nature. There is no state analog to the enumerated powers doctrine, but the right to bear arms remains very much alive among state courts. At present forty-four states have right-to-arms provisions in their state constitutlons, provisions that have been enforced with varying degrees of enthusiasm on the part of state judiciaries.' Perhaps those states whose right-toarms provisions have been subject to lackluster enforcement will begin to enforce them more vigorously; perhaps those states that have already enforced their right-to-arms provisions with some degree of vigor will begin to scrutinize legislation and regulation that trench on firearms possession even more closely. Or, perhaps, protection at the federal level will encourage state courts to slack off in their protection of state constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
As we write this Article, Heller remains less than a year old, and it is surely too early to issue pronouncements regarding its legacy in the lower courts. Nonetheless, it appears to us that-compared with our experience following lower-court reactions to Lopez and Morrison-the Heller decision is getting more early response from the lower courts than either of those cases did. While the majority of invocations, as with those earlier cases, come from the sort of hopeful felons who tend to get short shrift from federal courts, not all responses have been dismissive, and there appear to be a number of courts that are conscientiously attempting to adjust their reasoning in light of new Supreme Court case law.
In part, this may say something about our legal culture, which tends to take positively enumerated individual rights more seriously than limits on governmental power, a view which is something of a departure from that which prevailed at the time of the framing.' 30 Unlike the Commerce Clause cases, the Heller case also has analogs in state constitutional law in the large majority of states that have their own right-to-arms provisions, and it is likely to produce at least something of a gravitational effect in state right-to-arms cases. It is even possible that-as with other areas, such as sodomy laws' 3 -we will see cross-fertilization and even competition among states and between the states and the federal courts as this case law develops. It should, at any rate, be fascinating to observe-which is a good thing, as we plan to continue observing it.
